Post-Apartheid Sufi Resurgence by Cassiem, A.
3 8  I S I M  R E V I E W  1 9  /  S P R I N G  2 0 0 7
Rituals in Motion
A R M I E N  C A S S I E M
Post-Apartheid Sufi 
Resurgence
As the reality of apartheid finally 
crumbled in South Africa in 1994, 
many prominent Sufi shaykhs visited 
the country in an attempt to recruit 
new disciples into their particular Sufi 
brotherhoods. Among others, these 
included: Shaykh Nazim al-Haqqani 
and Shaykh Hisham Kabbani of the 
Naqshbandi Order, the late Shaykh 
Alawi al-Maliki of the Alawi Order, and 
Shaykh Hasan Cisse of the Tijani Order 
(who was officially received by President Thabo Mbeki). During their 
visits, the Shaykhs appointed local followers to be representatives of 
their Sufi brotherhood in Southern Africa. The Shaykhs spoke at local 
mosques where big crowds turned up to join in prayer and listen to 
their messages. The large numbers in attendance were indicative of 
the growing appeal of Sufism in the 1990s to the Muslim community 
of South Africa. 
The warmth with which these Shaykhs were received can be partly 
explained by the historical trajectory of Islam in South Africa. For cen-
turies since the mid-1600s, when the first Muslims arrived at the Cape 
from the Malay Archipelago and surrounding area as prisoners and po-
litical exiles, the public practice of Islam had been forbidden and viola-
tion was punishable by death. Covert Sufi rituals provided an impor-
tant substitute at a time when Islam could not be publicly practised. 
Though these restrictions had long since been lifted, and normative 
Islam had become the dominant expression of Islam, the collective 
memory of these historical roots had produced the popular idea that 
the “founding fathers” of Islam in South Africa had been highly trained 
in Islamic mysticism and this, in turn, had instilled a favourable attitude 
toward Sufism among many present-day South African Muslims.
More importantly still the local Sufi leaders who had held a rather 
peripheral position in the Muslim community during apartheid, found 
themselves directly juxtaposed to the incumbent ulama. The author-
ity of these ulama had been in decline for some 
decades. Reasons for this included their rather 
ambivalent—critics would say collaborationist—
positions towards apartheid. Many imams had 
favoured the preservation of Islamic institutions 
over the need to stand up for justice, arguing that 
the apartheid regime had not outlawed Islam and 
that mosques had been allowed to function—had 
this not been the case, they insist, they would have 
been first to resist the regime, even at the cost of 
death.1 Another issue that had recently shaken 
their credibility in the eyes of many Muslims was 
that most of the current imams had obtained 
their training in the finer points of Islamic juris-
prudence and theology in the Middle East. Right-
ly or wrongly, this contributed to them being seen 
by the community to be either Salafi or Wahhabi 
orientated. Moreover, many Muslims saw this allegation confirmed in 
what they felt to be a neglect of the spiritual needs of the local commu-
nity by the graduates of Middle Eastern religious institutes. Ironically, in 
this atmosphere the foreign Sufi Shaykhs who visited South Africa were 
seen as more credible than the local Muslim ulama.
Ulama response to Sufi resurgence
The Sufi resurgence has been particularly prevalent in the Western 
Cape Province, which is where the majority of the Muslim community 
in South Africa live. While Muslims make up only 1.5 percent of the na-
tionwide population of 45 million, in the Western Cape Province they 
form around 10 percent of its popula-
tion. Muslims in South Africa are mostly 
concentrated in urban areas and con-
stitute a cosmopolitan group consist-
ing of a variety of ethnicities, language 
groups, and social classes. The Group 
Areas Act of 1950 also displaced large 
numbers of non-whites, including 
Muslims, to racially segregated neigh-
bourhoods where Muslims established 
mosques and madrasas.
While the above shows that Islam is a more “visible” religion in these 
areas than crude statistics would indicate,2 the fact that 47 percent 
of the Muslims live in and around Cape Town bespeaks the discur-
sive and ideological power that religious bodies there can potentially 
exert over the entire Muslim community of South Africa. The most 
influential Islamic institution is the Muslim Judicial Council (herein-
after MJC) of Cape Town. It was established in 1945 by a few Middle 
Eastern and locally trained theologians in order to deal with legal ju-
risprudential matters.3 Most imams of the almost 150 mosques in the 
Western Cape Province align themselves to the MJC. The majority of 
these imams are not associated with a Sufi order, but they often dem-
onstrate a relaxed attitude to Sufism. This can, for example, be seen 
in the fact that the two Cape Town Muslim community radio stations, 
the Voice of the Cape and Radio 786,4 regularly air programmes on 
Sufism that are hosted by local Sufi personalities, such as Professor 
Yusuf da Costa, and local shaykhs of the Naqshbandi and Darqawi-
yyah brotherhoods.
The incumbent imams are well acquainted with the appeal Sufism 
exercises in Cape Town. Their complacent attitude over the past few 
years stands in stark contrast to their previous attitudes towards Sufi 
practices during the 1960s and later when members of the MJC came 
out strongly against certain ideas expressed by the Sufis. In one such 
incident, leaders of the MJC called Sufism a “Barelwi Menace” and in 
another, Sufi practices were labelled superficial and the behaviour of 
certain disciples unacceptable.5 In 2001 a well-known imam aligned 
to the MJC accused the Naqshbandi-Haqqanis of being “shaykh-” and 
“grave- worshippers.” The pro-Sufis, led by Professor da Costa, in turn 
accused him of being “small minded,” “intolerant,” and not least of all, 
a “Wahhabi.” The “Sufi-Wahhabi” debate, as these disputes were later 
known, played itself out in columns of widely read Cape newspapers 
with letters being written back and forth by the two groups and their 
respective supporters accusing each other of being outside the fold 
of Islam. 
Nevertheless, this debate was more than an ideological struggle 
in which each camp tried to vilify the ideas of the other. It was also 
about winning over the loyalties and the hearts of the Cape Muslim 
community and an attempt to be seen as the legitimate authority 
and representative of South African Muslims at the Cape. Predict-
ably, the Sufi camp tried to popularize the idea that they represented 
the old familiar good (Sufism) versus the foreign evil (Wahhabism). 
These two traditions were portrayed as incompatible and mutually 
opposed interpretations of Islam. The pro-Sufi group accused the 
Wahhabi group, as they had labelled them, of embarking on a “cam-
paign of misinformation” that projects a “wrong perception of Islam.” 
These blunt attacks had benefitted the pro-Sufis; and as long as the 
“other” could be depicted as anti-Sufi, the Wahhabi cloak would fit 
their opponent just fine. In so doing, the pro-Sufi group had hoped to 
win the loyalties of a Muslim community that was aware of the recent 
appeal Sufism had because of its Islamic roots. Also, no organization 
perceived as sympathetic to Wahhabi ideas could ever hope to enjoy 
majority support from the local Muslim community.
The Sufi tradition in South Africa—with roots 
going back to the seventeenth century—
regained momentum in the 1990s. Capitalizing 
on the reduced authority of the ulama, the 
new Sufi leaders could claim to represent a 
normative South African version of Islam. 
Moreover, their focus on the grassroots has 
increased their visibility in many townships and 
allowed them to provide spiritual solutions to 
everyday social issues.
[T]he Naqshbandi-
Haqqanis took their 
Sufi ritual sessions 
on a “road show” to 
the community.
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The Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
brotherhood in Cape Town
Discursive struggles about the authenticity of 
Sufism, centred on historically evolved ideas about 
foreignness and authenticity, are important to un-
derstand the Sufi resurgence in this South African 
context; they also visibly and audibly underline 
the renewed importance of Sufi brotherhoods. It 
is equally vital to look into the everyday practices 
of specific brotherhoods. The Naqshbandi-Haqqa-
ni Order in Cape Town is an apt example of how 
the Sufi success is sustained through its activities.
In 1998, Professor da Costa, a retired Geography 
Didactics university lecturer from the University of 
the Western Cape in Cape Town, was both initiated 
and made khalifa (vicegerent) of the Naqshbandi 
brotherhood in Southern Africa by Shaykh Hisham 
Kabbani when he visited Cape Town.6 Unlike other 
Sufi shaykhs who withdrew from communal ac-
tivity, he has continued to be active through his 
teaching, his writings, community radio appear-
ances, and talks in mosques at Friday congrega-
tional prayers on matters relating to spirituality 
and the superiority of the divine law. The roles 
of the shaykh and of his appointed vicegerents 
are central to the brotherhood. Some scholars 
even go so far as to assert that the shaykh is the 
brotherhood, his disciples being seen as more at-
tached to him, than to the teachings of the brotherhood. Speaking of 
Shaykh Nazim al-Haqqani, Professor da Costa mentions that when he 
is in his company, he feels humble and constantly reminded of Allah. 
Partly due to the Shaykh’s spiritual magnetism, da Costa and some of 
his local disciples travel at least once a year to Shaykh Nazim’s zawiya 
(ritual lodge) in Lefke, Cyprus, where they attend talks given by the 
Shaykh. Even though this is where Professor da Costa was instructed to 
work amongst the poor people in South Africa, he concedes that there 
is no structural links between the local Naqshbandi-Haqqani branch 
and Naqshbandi-Haqqani International. Shaykh Nazim gives him, like 
his vicegerents elsewhere, leverage in aspects relating to local politics 
and organization.
In August 2005, the Naqshbandi-Haqqani claimed to have over 300 
registered disciples. These disciples, known as “the workers,” a term 
that could also denote their subservient relationship to Professor da 
Costa, constitute the brotherhood’s sub-structures. These “workers” are 
responsible for tasks ranging from fund-raising, erecting structures in 
informal and impoverished townships that would serve as madrasas, 
and to also leading the Sufi rituals with the ijaza (permission) granted 
to them by Shaykh Nazim al-Haqqanni. The brotherhood’s sub-struc-
ture is dominated by middle-class professionals in the fields of educa-
tion, law, and finance. This membership provides the brotherhood with 
a strong and professional social base.
Rituals on the move
As is the case with Sufi orders elsewhere, the dhikr (remembrance of 
Allah) plays a central role. It leads them from the world of separation and 
externality to that of union and interiority, ultimately becoming unified 
with Allah. However, unlike Naqshbandi-Haqqanis in other parts of the 
world, the Naqshbandi-Haqqanis in Cape Town do not hold their dhikr 
in a zawiya. In 2002 Shaykh Nazim al-Haqqani instructed Professor da 
Costa to work amongst the poor people. To obtain financial resources 
they sold their zawiya, located in a middle class residential suburb, 
and used the money for the upgrading and construction of informal 
religious facilities in predominantly black working-class areas around 
Cape Town. Thus, instead of attracting the community to the dhikr at 
their Sufi centre, the Naqshbandi-Haqqanis took their Sufi ritual ses-
sions on a “road show” to the community.
Two female-only dhikr groups and the organization An-Nisa (“the 
women” translated from Arabic) cater for the needs of women in the 
order. The ladies dhikr groups hold their sessions at mosques on Sat-
urday afternoons. An-Nisa’s primary objective is to empower women 
through various spiritual and educational programmes. It holds quar-
terly workshops on current issues affecting women. These range from 
the rights of women in marriage, to abortion, breast cancer, and HIV/
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AIDS. As such, the Naqshbandi-Haqqanis in South Africa provide room 
for active female agency within the brotherhood. This has never been 
commonplace, but is slowly becoming acceptable.
The past decade has also witnessed an increase of da‘wah-related 
work in the black townships amongst which is the establishment of 
Sufi centres in Cape Town. In 2004, the Naqshbandi-Haqqanis were in-
vited to upgrade an existing shack into a facility that would serve as a 
mosque and madrasa to Muslims in Khayelitsha (a township south of 
Cape Town that houses more than half a million black residents). Since 
then they have established a few similar structures in the area, serving 
as a base for their da‘wah activities. Such activities, as well as their will-
ingness to address a variety of social problems, have been the source 
of their apparent success among black South Africans. 
From at least the latter half of the previous century, the Muslim Ju-
dicial Council has tried to establish an ideological hegemony amongst 
Muslims. Their interpretation of Islam was based more on their invo-
cation of the Arabic texts and jurisprudence, rather than on providing 
and teaching an Islam that also included elements of spirituality. The 
post-Apartheid era has seen an influx of international Sufi personalities, 
which has shifted the place of Sufism from the periphery to be juxta-
posed alongside, even surpassing at times, the authority of the mosque 
imams. In the South-African context, neo-Sufism 
entails certainly more than a personal quest for 
the divine. It is also an ideological phenomenon 
that is challenging the very establishment of the 
national Muslim religious leadership. In the words 
of Professor da Costa: “Sufism and its Sufi shaykhs 
are providing the local Muslims with a spiritual 
freshness that the local religious leadership has 
… not been able to provide the people with.”
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